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Abstract
We examine the effect of remittances on the legitimacy of democracy in Africa, testing
whether remittance recipients are less likely to support democracy than are non-recipients.
We hypothesise that the effect of remittances on support for democracy varies across groups
of individuals sharing similar but unobserved background characteristics. Using the Afro-
barometer surveys, we try to find out whether the respondents fall into different hidden
clusters in such a way that the effect of remittances on the degree of support for democracy
depends on the cluster. Our results support that remittances may be a curse for the degree
of endorsement and support for democracy depending on the cluster of individuals that we
consider. The analysis of the probability of being in the remittance curse cluster indicates
that the perception of national priorities plays an important role. Indeed, people who attest
that freedom and rights are the main national priorities have a lower probability of belong-
ing to the remittances curse cluster than individuals who choose national priorities that are
oriented towards the economic conditions of their country.
Key words: Migrant Remittances; Support for democracy; Multilevel Mixture-regressions
JEL Classification: D01; F24; O55
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1 Introduction
Remittance inflows have been rapidly increasing in many developing countries, including in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and influential studies have been carried out to shed light on the effects of these
inflows on economic and social outcomes such as inequality and poverty alleviation(Adams
and Page (2005), Acosta et al. (2008)), education (Edwards and Ureta (2003)), and growth
(Catrinescu et al. (2009)), among others. Recent work has attempted to go beyond the effects of
remittances on development, and has tried to figure out the effects of these flows on institutional
dimensions, such as corruption (Abdih et al. (2012)), government effectiveness and the rule of law
(Berdiev et al. (2013)), and protest (Acevedo (2013)). In a similar spirit, another strand of the
literature has also looked at the institutional effect of remittances at a more disaggregated level,
the community and individual level, and the results have shown that remittance recipients may
have different behaviors and preferences in politics than their counterparts. This particularly
includes investigations in Latin America and specifically in Mexico that have looked at how
remittances influence the political participation and involvement of those left behind (Goodman
and Hiskey (2008), Germano (2013)). 1
Surprisingly, Sub-Saharan Africa has received a considerable amount of remittances, yet
little is known about their attitudinal and behavioral consequences for the politics in this region
(Dionne et al. (2014)), while studies of the effect of such flows on the legitimacy of democracy
are quite nonexistent. This paper will bring remittances into this part of the literature, and
look at the effect of remittances on the degree of support for democracy on the part of the
individuals left behind at home in this region. It tries to find out whether the respondents
fall into different hidden clusters in such a way that the effect of remittances on the degree
of support for democracy depends on the cluster. It also looks at to what extent individuals’
perceptions of the main national priorities may explain the link between remittances and support
for democracy.
Good institutions, such as democracy has been posited as a universal value (Sen (1999)),
and then associated with many desirable features, including development (Persson and Tabellini
(2006)) and social welfare (Siegle et al. (2004)). The question of how to promote democracy
has gained considerable attention and has been continually addressed in the context of less ad-
vanced nations such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political scholars have argued that the
legitimacy of institutions, or the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves, and
1It has also been addressed the link between remittances and the process of democratization during the
municipality elections in Latin America (e.g, Pfutze (2014), Pfutze (2012)).
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considered right and proper (Lipset (1963)), is important for the sustainability and the effec-
tiveness of institutions. Hence, it has been asserted that the degree to which people support
democracy in a country is a pre-requisite for the level and the stability of democracy in that
country (Lipset (1959), Diamond (1999)). A new literature has thus emerged, looking at the
major determinants of support for democracy in Sub-Saharan African countries using the avail-
able Afrobarometer data. Different aspects of individual socio-economic characteristics have
been investigated. Among them, the relationship between the level of education and support
for democracy (Evans and Rose (2007b), Evans and Rose (2007a)), following the theory of
Lipset (1959) which claims that education is a prerequisite for the endorsement and support
for democracy. Also MacCauley and Gyimah-Boadi (2009) have looked at the relationship be-
tween religion and support for democracy while Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014) have been
interested in the gender dimension, focusing on the potential explanations of the gender gap in
support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.2
Yet, this previous literature on the determinants of support for democracy in Sub-Saharan
Africa has not much considered the relationship between remittances and political engagement
despite the growing amount of remittances in many Sub-Saharan African countries and the
recent studies in Mexico that have found a negative association between remittances and political
behavior. As far as we know, an exception is the recent study by Dionne et al. (2014), who
have analyzed the effect of remittances on political participation in a cross-country analysis of a
number of African countries, testing whether remittances are a curse or a blessing for political
participation. Their results are mixed and show that while remittance recipients are less likely
to vote, they are more likely to contact the government and to take part in demonstrations and
protests. This finding has shown that the political effect of remittances in the African context is
different from that in the Mexican context, where many scholars have supported the thesis of the
curse of remittances in political participation (Goodman and Hiskey (2008),Germano (2013)).
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it goes one step further and tests whether remittances
are a curse or a blessing for the support of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that
remittance recipients may not behave similarly in politics and that the effect of remittances
on support for democracy varies across groups of individuals sharing similar but unobserved
characteristics. In other words, we consider the possibility of the existence of hidden clusters of
individuals in our sample such that the effect of remittances on support for democracy depends
on the cluster to which a given individual belongs. The clusters are a priori unknown, and will be
2See also Konte (2014b) for another study that has tried to explain why are women are less democratic than
men in Sub-Sahara Africa.
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defined endogenously using all the available information in our data. For this purpose, we apply
the newly developed method of multilevel mixture regression analysis (Asparouhov and Muthen
(2009), Henry and Muthen (2010)) that incorporates a latent variable to classify individuals
into different clusters. This technique is an extension of the standard model of finite mixture of
regressions (McLachlan and Peel (2000)). In addition, it is suitable for hierarchical data, and
accounts for the nested structure of the data. This approach provides a better fit for a multilevel
data structure and it enables taking into account any possible unobserved heterogeneity that
may exist in the lowest and highest levels of the data. We relax the hypothesis that all the
individuals behave similarly , and test the hypothesis that whether remittances are a curse or a
blessing depends on the cluster to which an individual belongs.
Second, after finding the different clusters of individuals that share similar but unobserved
background characteristics and determining the effects of remittances within these clusters, the
paper provides an analysis of the determinants of the probability for a given individual to be not
located in the remittance curse cluster. As potential determinants, we propose the perception
of the most important national priority at the individual level in the sample. This choice is
made following the recent arguments by Abdih et al. (2012) and Berdiev et al. (2013) who
have emphasized that remittances enable households to provide public goods and services (e.g.,
health services and education) on their own if these items are publicly non-existent or poorly
provided. Thus, we believe that the nature of the national priority chosen by an individual may
play an important role because the incentive for supporting a democratic regime may, firstly,
depends on whether the national priority perceived is a good that can exclusively be offered
publicly, and secondly, on whether a democratic regime is more willing to provide such a good.
We then investigate whether people who assert that freedom and rights are the most important
national priorities are less likely than are people who choose economic and social aspects as the
most important national priorities to be in the cluster where remittances are a curse for the
support for democracy.
For our analysis we use round 4 of the Afrobarometer, which is, as far as we know, in our
knowledge the only survey round of the Afrobarometer that provides information on whether
respondents receive remittances or not. Our multilevel mixture regression estimations show
that the respondents in our sample are best grouped into two different clusters. In the first
cluster, remittances have a negative impact on the probability of supporting democracy, while
in the second cluster the effect is neutral. The analysis of the determinants of the probability of
being in the remittance curse cluster indicates that having rights and freedom as the first, most
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important, national priority increases the probability of being classified into the second cluster
where remittance recipients are as likely to support democracy as are non-remittance recipients.
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature
that has investigated the impact of remittances on different economic and social outcomes. A
number of studies have shown, using different samples of countries, that remittances present
desirable development features, including poverty and inequality alleviation (Adams and Page
(2005), Acosta et al. (2008)), consumption smoothness (Gupta et al. (2009)) and education
(Edwards and Ureta (2003)) among others. It has also been argued that remittances are im-
portant sources of investment for small businesses and talented entrepreneurs that lack capital
in order to fully realize their potential (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006b)). In parallel, an-
other part of the literature has documented the negative aspects that remittances may generate.
These include the altruistic effect (Stark (1995)) indicating that remittances are mainly used for
consumption but not for productive activities, and the moral hazard effect (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006a)) suggesting that remittances may increase the incentive of recipients to switch
from labor to leisure. Remittances may also produce the Dutch disease , hurting the export
activities of the economy (Bourdet and Falck (2006)). Regarding the effect of remittances on
the growth rate of a country, results are mixed and the question of whether remittances are a
curse or a blessing remains inconclusive (Catrinescu et al. (2009), Abdih et al. (2012)).
This paper is also related to the literature that has gone beyond the development sphere,
looking at whether remittances may be detrimental for the quality of institutions. For instance,
Berdiev et al. (2013) have investigated, in a cross-sectional analysis, the effect of remittances
on corruption, while in a similar manner, Abdih et al. (2012) have also looked at its effect on
government effectiveness and the rule of law in addition to corruption. Both of these studies have
provided evidence that remittances deteriorate the quality of institutions. The argument behind
this is that an increase in the level of remittances increases the likelihood that the government
will spend more time in rent seeking behavior and will not invest as much in delivering public
goods, because recipients may procure such goods on their own using remittances.
In addition, there is an influential part of the literature that has focused on the attitudinal
and behavioral effects of remittances in politics. Some studies have investigated this issue in
Latin America, mainly of Mexico. The findings show that remittances are detrimental for
people’s participation and involvement in the political life in Mexico (Goodman and Hiskey
(2008), Germano (2013)). While Goodman and Hiskey (2008) support that there is a decrease
in political engagement in municipalities with high level of out-migrants, Germano (2013) carry
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out a deeper empirical analysis and find that remittance recipients are less likely to pressure
and oppose politicians, because they are more optimistic about their economic conditions. In
the African context, little is known about the effects of remittances on individual behavior in
politics. As far as we know, an exception is the analysis by Dionne et al. (2014), who have
investigated whether remittances are another resource curse in Sub-Saharan Africa, as they are
in the Mexican context. Their results provide evidence for a mixed effect of remittances on
political participation in Africa. Indeed, people who received remittances are less likely to vote
but are more likely to contact the government and to take part in demonstrations and protests.
Finally, this paper is closely related to the literature on the determinants of the support
for democracy in Sub-Saharan African countries. There have been different influential studies
that have tested potential individual characteristics that may affect people’s endorsement of
and preference for democracy over its alternatives. Among them, one can note the work on
education and support for democracy (e.g, Mattes and Bratton (2001), Bratton and Mattes
(2005), Evans and Rose (2007b)). These authors have posited a positive effect of education on
the degree of support for democracy, following the theory of Lipset that argues that education
is a pre-requisite for democracy. The relationship between religion and support for democracy
has also been studied by some scholars, including MacCauley and Gyimah-Boadi (2009) who
have provided evidence of a non link between Islam and support for democracy in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In many of the analyses in this literature, it has been shown that women are less than
men likely to support democracy. Yet, few studies have been carried out to explain this gender
gap. Among them, one can note the recent works by Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014) and
Konte (2014b) who have attempted to provide economic, political, and social explanations of
this gender gap. However, so far as our knowledge extends, this literature has not much focused
on remittances, another source of revenue, non-taxable and that goes directly to households who
may in turn use it to buy public goods that are weakly provided.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data,
while Section 3 sets up the empirical model. In Section 4 we discuss our empirical results, while
the last section concludes.
2 Data: The Afrobarometer
For our empirical analysis we will use the round 4 of the Afrobarometer, which, so far as our
knowledge extends, is the only survey of the Afrobarometer that provides information about
whether the respondents receive remittances or not. Round 4 includes 27,000 individuals inter-
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viewed in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries. Our dependent variable is support for democracy,
and to measure it we follow the previous extensive literature that has been interested in the
determinants of support for democracy using the Afrobarometer data. We refer to question Q30
of the questionnaire, which asks “Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?
”The possible answers are: (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; (2) In
some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; (3) For someone like me,
it does not matter what kind of government we have and (4) I don’t know. Indeed, it is not
obvious how to rank these different responses in terms of preference for democracy. In other
word, we cannot ensure whether reply (2) indicates a higher or a lower degree of support for
democracy than (3). Hence, we follow the standard way that has been previously applied in
influential studies (e.g, Evans and Rose (2007b), Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014)). We define
a dummy SD that takes the value of 1 if the respondent supports democracy, meaning giving
the first reply, zero if the respondent gives one of the last three replies.
To investigate the impact of remittances on the degree of support for democracy, we refer to
the question Q87 of the survey that asks How often, if at all, do you receive money remittances
from friends or relatives outside of the country?. There are different possible responses going
from never to at least once a month. We code remit as taking the value of zero if the respondent
has never received remittances, and 1 if the respondent has received remittances from friends
or relatives outside of the country. Table 2 shows the percentage of remittance recipients by
country. One can note that the share of respondents who have received remittances varies
significantly across countries, and that there is a gap of 44 points between the lowest percentage
and the highest one. Madagascar records the lowest value of 4.6% while Cape Verde has the
highest value where almost 50% of the individuals interviewed assert that they have received
remittances from friends or relatives.
In this paper we are also interested in figuring out the effect of the perception of the most
important national priorities on the classification of the respondents into the different clusters
detected in our sample. In fact, we argue that those who choose the rights of the people and
order in their country as the most important national priorities support democracy as much
as the non-recipients, because rights and order are goods that individuals cannot obtain with
remittances, and a democratic regime may be more willing to provide such goods. In contrast,
people who assert that the economic conditions are the most important national priority may
be able to improve their standard of living using remittances, and are then less likely to reply
that democracy is the best political regime.
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To measure the most important national priorities, we will refer to the questions Q40A and
Q40B of the survey. In the former, the respondents are asked the question: If you had to
choose, which one of the following things: Is most important?. The different possible responses
are, 1) Maintaining order in the nation; 2) Giving people more say in government decisions;
3) Protecting people’s right to live freely; and 4) Improving economic conditions for the poor.
There are also a few people who reply that the most important national priority is none of these
four, and for simplification, we consider them as missing values. The question Q40B follows up
and asks: And which would be the next most important? We first create three dummy variables:
order1, rights1 and economic1 using Q40A. The variable order1 takes the value of one if the
individual gives the first response, and zero otherwise, while the dummy rights1 is equal to 1 if
the respondent replies either 2 or 3 and 0 otherwise. The dummy economic1 is 1 if the individual
replies 4 and 0 otherwise. Next, we introduce the dummies order2, rights2 and economic2 for
the second most important national priority using question Q40B applying the same codification
rule as for the first three dummies. Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics for these indicators
of national priorities. Overall, the majority of the people in our sample have chosen economic
conditions as the first, most important, national priority. Indeed, we have roughly 59% of the
respondents who put economic conditions in the first place, then this value decreases to 27% in
the second choice. In contrast, for rights and order, there is a higher proportion of individuals
who choose them as the second most important national priority than the first.
As additional controls, we will follow the previous literature and then include the variables
that have been significant in previous studies. For instance, we add the respondent’s level of
education following the theory of Lipset which claims that education is a pre-requisite for the
endorsement and acceptance of a democratic regime 3 . We also control for gender, a variable
that has been of interest recent years, where some scholars have been interested in the gender
gap in support for democracy in Sub-Saharan African countries 4. We will also control for
additional variables, including the age of the respondents, which may inform us whether youth
supports democracy as much as the rest of the population 5, the employment status, access to
media through TV, radio and newspapers, access to food, medicine and water. We also consider
a variable measuring whether the respondent has voted during the last elections, and whether
the respondent has ever experienced corruption. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of
the different variables.
3Mattes and Bratton (2001), Bratton and Mattes (2005), Evans and Rose (2007b)
4e.g,Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014), Konte (2014b)
5See Resnick and Casale (2014) and Resnick and Casale (2011) for investigation on youth and politics in Africa.
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3 Empirical strategy
We have data for 20 countries indexed by j =1,2,...20, and nj denotes the number of individuals
interviewed in country j. Our dependent variable is support for democracy, denoted by SD,
which is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if we support democracy and 0 otherwise
(see the previous section for explanations). Individuals are nested within country, then people
who live in the same country share similar contextual characteristics and in turn they may have
some similar behavior. Standard estimation methods ignore such a clustering effect and may
then yield biased estimations of the standard errors. The multilevel method has the advantage
of taking into account such clustering effects. Multilevel analysis has gained an important place
in recent years due to the increase in the available data that has a nested structure. In the
next subsection, we will specify our baseline multilevel model. We will then present a brief
review of the standard mixture model before moving on to the multilevel mixture of regression
model, relaxing the hypothesis that the data is generated by a single model in favor of multiple
equations.
3.1 Standard Multilevel Model
Given the dichotomous structure of the variable of interest, we estimate a varying-intercept
multilevel (or hierarchical) logit model where individuals are nested within countries. Hence,
we will consider a two-level model where the highest level is the country and the lowest level is
the respondent. Let us write Prob(SDij = 1, ωij) for the probability that the individual i living
in country j supports democracy given ωij . This probability can be expressed as follows:
Prob(SDij = 1, ωij) =
1
1 + exp(−ωij) (1)
where,
ωij = β0 + β1remitij + β2Xij + ij (2)
Our parameter of interest is β1, which tells us about the impact of receiving remittances on
the probability of supporting democracy. A negative sign means that being a remittance recipient
decreases the probability of supporting democracy compared to a non-recipient. The vector Xij
contains the socio-economic characteristics of individual i living in country j. Individuals who
live in the same country may not be independent, thus standard errors may be underestimated
by the traditional regression techniques. Multilevel modeling has the advantage of taking into
9
account such a clustering effect by allowing the intercept to vary across countries such that:
Level 1: ωij = β0j + β1remitij + β2Xij + ij, εij ∼ N(0, σ2),
Level 2: β0j = β00 + uj, uj ∼ N(0, δ2), εij⊥uj
(3)
Thus the general model can be written as follow:
ωij = β00 + β1remitij + β2Xij + uj + ij (4)
The term uj + ij in Equation 4 represents the random part of the model, where uj is the
country-specific effect and ij is the individual-level error term.
Using this framework, we do account for the heterogeneity that exists at the country level but
we ignore the possible unobserved heterogeneity that may exist at the individual level. In fact,
we may have in the data the existence of potential unobserved heterogeneity, in the variation
of the estimates across groups of respondents sharing similar but unobserved characteristics.
For instance, the effect of remit on the degree of support for democracy may depend on the
latent class to which an individual belongs to. Such heterogeneity can be captured at the lowest
level, and may not be properly taken into account when we only consider heterogeneity at the
country level by allowing the intercept to vary across countries as in Equation 4. As mentioned
by Asparouhov and Muthen (2009), unobserved heterogeneity may exist not only at level 2 at
the expense of level 1. Using simulated and real data, these authors have pointed out that:“level
1 heterogeneity in the form of latent classes can be mistaken for level 2 heterogeneity in the
form of the random effects that are used in conventional two-level regression analysis”. Thus
applying the multilevel mixture model we will be able to take into account possible unobserved
heterogeneity at both levels, the lowest and the highest.
3.2 Multilevel Finite Mixture Model
The finite mixture model (McLachlan and Peel (2000), Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2006)) has rapidly
attracted increasing interest over the last decades in a number of subjects, including in social sci-
ences and behavioral studies. It is an appropriate technique for endogenously taking into account
the possible unobserved heterogeneity that may exist in the data. For multilevel (or hierarchical)
data, individuals are nested within countries, and thus the standard mixture method may violate
this dependency assumption. Thanks to the influential research by numerous scholars (Vermunt
(2003), Asparouhov and Muthen (2008), Asparouhov and Muthen (2009)), a multilevel finite
mixture framework has been proposed with different extensions (parametric and nonparametric)
that can be applied to hierarchical data, accounting for the nested structure of the data.
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In our previous specification, we have assumed that the effect of remittances on the degree
of support for democracy is similar for all the individuals in the sample, without testing the
existence of multiple subtypes. We now relax this hypothesis and allow the data to detect
whether the data is generated by a model with different subtypes of individuals such that the
impact of remittances on the degree of support for democracy varies with the subtype. The
subtypes are a priori not observed and are latent.
3.2.1 Standard Finite Mixture Model
For simplicity, let us assume that (Y,X) = (yi, xi)
n
i=1 are a pair of a set random variable yi and
a set of explanatory variables xi. The index i is the individual index, and n is the total number
of observations. We define Ci to be the latent cluster variable for a given individual i, where Ci
varies between 1 and K. By definition, the mixture of regression model based on the density of
Y conditional on X is expressed as follows:
f(Y |X,Θ) =
n∏
i=1
[
K∑
k=1
pik(Ci = k)fk(yi|xi;βk, σk)
]
(5)
where pik is the probability of belonging to the cluster k, and fk(yi|x;βk, σk) is a conditional
probability distribution characterized by a set of parameters (βk, σk) and of co-variates x. βk
and σk are unknown and hence estimated. We suppose fk is a Gaussian distribution.
For a simple illustration if K = 1, then all the observations are generated by the same
data-generating process given by:
yi = xiβ + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2) (6)
In this case the standard specification in Equation 6 is sufficient to study the impact of X on
Y . If K = 2 then a mixture of linear regressions assumes that an observation belonging to
the first group and one belonging to the second group would not be generated by the same
data-generating process. The mixture model with two components reduces to:
Group 1: yi = xiβ1 + ε1, ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21),
Group 2: yi = xiβ2 + ε2, ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22),
(7)
where ε1 and ε2 are independent and identical normally distributed error terms with variances
of σ21 and σ
2
2, respectively.
The choice of the value of K is crucial and is generally chosen using some goodness of
statistical fit criterion such as the Bayesian criterion (BIC) or the Consistent Akaike criterion
(CAIC). Once the different parameters of the model are estimated, we may compute, for each
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individual in the data, its probability of being classified in the given group k using the Bayes
rule, given by:
pˆiik =
pikfk(yi|xi ; βˆk, σˆk)∑K
k=1 pikfk(yi|xi ; βˆk, σˆk)
In summary, in this standard setting, we can observe that the specification may not be
appropriate for a multilevel data structure where individuals are nested within the highest level.
For instance, in data where students are nested within schools, or doctors within hospitals,
or individuals within countries, the standard mixture method tends to violate the clustering
effect. In the next section we are thus going to introduce the extended mixture model, where
we consider two latent class variables: one at the lowest level and one at the highest level. Such
a specification allows us to take into account the unobserved heterogeneities that may exist at
each of the two different levels of the data.
3.2.2 Multilevel Finite Mixture Model
Define yij to be the response of individual i living in country j, and nj to be the total number
of observations in country j. Then
∑J
j=1 nj = n. Denote by Cij the latent class variable at
the lowest level, i.e, at the individual level, and by Gj the latent class variable at the highest
level, i.e, the country level. We suppose that the number of latent classes at the individual level
varies between 1 and K, while the one at the country level varies between 1 and L. The general
multilevel finite mixture model can be written as follows:
f(Y |X; Θ) =
J∏
j=1
[
L∑
l=1
pil(Gj = l)
[ nj∏
i=1
f(Yj |Gj = l;Xj)
]]
(8)
where,
f(Y |Gj = l;X) =
K∑
Cij=1
pik(Cij = k|Gj = l) ∗ f(yij |Cij = k;xij ,Θ) (9)
pil(Gj = l) is the probability that country j belongs to the latent class l, and pik(Cij =
k|Gj = l) is the probability that individual i living in country j belongs to the latent class k
given that its country belongs to latent class l. Combining equation 8 and equation 9 we obtain
the following likelihood information in 10 that we will maximized using the EM approach for
the estimations of the set of parameters pil, pik, and Θ:
f(Y |X; Θ) =
J∏
j=1
 L∑
l=1
pil(Gj = l)
nj∏
i=1
 K∑
Cij=1
pik(Cij = k|Gj = l) ∗ f(yij |Cij = k;xij ,Θ)
 (10)
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Recall that in this paper our dependent variable is the dummy SDij , and our multilevel
mixture specification is then given by:
P (SD = 1|ω; Θ) =
J∏
j=1
 L∑
l=1
pil(Gj = l)
nj∏
i=1
 K∑
Cij=1
pik(Cij = k|Gj = l) ∗ P (SDij = 1|Cij = k;ωij ,Θ)

(11)
We can see in this equation that the probability, pik(Cij = k|Gj = l), that individual i living
in country j belongs to a given cluster k is conditional on the country cluster l to which its
country belongs .
The first hypothesis that we are interested in testing is whether the effect of remittances on
the support for democracy varies across groups of individuals sharing similar but unobserved
characteristics. For this purpose, we need to investigate whether our data is generated by
multiple hidden clusters such that the impact of remittances on the support for democracy
depends on the cluster to which a given individual belongs. Hence, using the Equation 10 we
will leave the data to detect the optimal number of clusters of individuals, and applying the
Bayes rule we will be able to compute the posterior probability that individual i living in country
j belongs to a cluster k conditional on the cluster l to which its country belongs.
Our second question asks is whether an individual’s perception of the most important na-
tional priority may explain that individual’s classification into the different clusters detected
endogenously using the above models. For this purpose, we re-estimate our multilevel mixture
model already defined in Equation 10 but now augmented by the national priority variables.
In fact, we endogenise the parameter pik(Cij = k|Gj = l) which becomes: pik(Cij = k|Gj =
l, priorityij). Our mixture model augmented with the individuals’ priorities can be then written
as follows:
P (SD = 1|Ω,priority;β) =
J∏
j=1
 L∑
l=1
pil(Gj = l)
nj∏
i=1
(
K∑
Cij=1
pik(Cij = k|Gj = l, priorityij) ∗ P (SDij = 1|Cij = k;ωij ,Θ))

(12)
4 Results and interpretation
4.1 Standard estimations
We start by estimating a simple multilevel model under the hypothesis that there exists a unique
single cluster. We only assume that individuals are nested within a country and then allow the
error terms to vary across countries. The results are reported in Table 4. We start with the
first column, which controls for remittances, education, and gender, and then subsequently we
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add additional control variables. Across the different columns we find that the coefficient on
remittances is negative and statistically significant at the 1% conventional level. This negative
sign indicates that receiving remittances from relatives or friends outside the home country
decreases the probability of supporting democracy in Sub-Sahara African region. The coefficients
on remittances are very similar across the different specifications. This finding suggests that
remittances are a curse for the degree of support for democracy, and it is in line with the previous
literature that has pointed out that remittances is a curse for politics in Mexico. Our results
are also partly in line with the recent study by Dionne et al. (2014), which has found that
remittances may hinder some aspects of political involvement, such as voting, in the African
context.
Moving on to the other explanatory variables that are included in our estimations, we find a
robust significant impact of education on the degree of support for democracy. Indeed, people
who have received a formal education have a higher probability of supporting democracy than
those who do not. This confirms the previous studies by Evans and Rose (2007b) and it is in line
with the theory of Lipset that emphasizes that education is a pre-requisite for the endorsement
and acceptance of democratic regimes. In addition, this positive effect of education becomes
stronger with the level of education, where individuals with secondary education have a higher
probability of supporting democracy than individuals only completing primary education, and
those with more than secondary education support democracy more than those with a lower
level of education. Across the different specifications, we observe a significant and negative sign
on gender, indicating that women are less likely than men to support democracy. This result
has received particular attention in the literature, starting with the influential paper in World
Development by Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014) who have tried to give potential explanations
of this gender gap, and relate it to the level of development and the institutional environment
of the countries in which these women live. Also Konte (2014a) has contributed to this debate,
and added the informal institutions that affect women’s daily life. Among the other co-variates,
we find some evidence that access to the media affects positively the probability of supporting
democracy, and having been confronted with corruption decreases it, while having voted during
the last elections increases it.
In summary, in this section we have provided evidence for a negative effect of remittances
on support for democracy in our sample of 20 Sub-Saharan African countries. The results
are robust to different specifications and to the inclusion of different individual characteristics.
However, in the different specifications, we have estimated a multilevel random intercept that
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takes into account possible heterogeneity at the country level but ignores possible unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual level. The next section is going to introduce these two types of
heterogeneity simultaneously in the model of estimations in the form of latent classes.
4.2 Multilevel Mixture of Regression Estimations
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The Remittance Effect varies across individual subtypes
In this section, we investigate whether there is some unobserved heterogeneity that exists at
the individual level, and we model this heterogeneity in terms of latent clusters. We try to find
out whether the respondents in the sample fall into different clusters in such a way that the
effect of remittances on the degree of endorsement and support for democracy depends on the
cluster. We first estimate the model in Equation 11 using different values for the individual
latent clusters K and for the country latent clusters L. For each combination of (k, l), we
estimate Equation 11 and present the goodness of fit. Doing so, we are able to take into account
the unobserved heterogeneity that exists at the lowest level and also the heterogeneity at the
highest level. Table 5 shows the values of two statistical information criteria: the BIC and the
CAIC. The optimal model is the one that has the lowest values of these two quantities. We
find that our best model is the one with two individual latent clusters and 6 different groups of
countries. We also observe that the models where we consider simultaneously the heterogeneity
in both levels, the lowest and the highest, perform better than the models where we consider
heterogeneity only at a single level.
We next present the estimation results of our preferred model in Table 6, where we present
the estimated coefficients by cluster. Focusing on our parameter of interest, remit, we find that
the coefficients across the different clusters are quite different. In fact, in the first cluster the
coefficients on remit is negative and significant at the conventional level of 1%. This indicates
that in this cluster, remittance recipients are less likely than others to support democracy.
In contrast, in the second cluster the coefficient on remit is not significant, indicating that
remittances do not have any impact for this cluster on the probability of supporting democracy.
Thus, in the second cluster, remittance recipients are as likely as non-recipients to support
democracy. This result is in line with our first hypothesis, showing that individuals in our data
do not behave similarly in politics.
Turning now to the additional explanatory variables included in our model, we find that
for all the coefficients that are significant, the signs are similar across the two latent clusters
(except for the coefficients on water). For instance, the level of education has a positive effect
on the degree of support for democracy for the two clusters and the magnitude of the coefficients
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decreases with the level of education. However, the magnitude of the coefficients are higher for
the second cluster, indicating that the effect of education on the degree of support for democracy
is stronger in the second cluster than in the first. Regarding the effect of being a woman on
the probability of supporting democracy, our results go in the same direction as the previous
literature, which has found that in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a gender gap in the support
for democracy, and that women are less likely to support democracy than are men (e.g, Garc´ıa-
Pen˜alosa and Konte (2014)). We also find a stronger effect of having been confronted with
corruption on the support for democracy in the second cluster than in the first one.
Table 6 shows the proportion of respondents within countries that have a higher probability
of being in the remittance curse cluster than in the second cluster where remittances have a
neutral effect on the degree of support for democracy. Half of the countries have all of their
respondents sorted into the first cluster. 6 Madagascar is the only country for which all the
respondents are fully classified into the second cluster. Table 7 shows the classification at the
highest level, i.e., at the country level. Recall that our best model contains 6 country clusters.
In this table, we can observe that our classification is probabilistic. Indeed, for almost all the
countries (except Liberia), the probability of being sorted into a cluster is equal to 1. In addition,
we have some heterogeneity in our classifications. Countries with different characteristics and
different sizes belong to the same group. For instance, in the third group we have Botswana,
which shares the same group with Benin and Uganda, while Cape Verde and Mali are together
in the first group. Lesotho and Madagascar are each alone in their own groups.
In summary, we have found, in an endogenous manner, that individuals behave differently
in politics and that the effect of remittances on the degree of endorsement and support for
democracy in Sub-Saharan African depends on the cluster that we consider. Indeed, our data is
better generated by a model with two different clusters, one in which remittances are harmful
for the legitimacy of democracy, and a second in which remittances do not affect people support
for democracy. We are next going to consider to what extent does the individual perception of
the main national priority determine the classification of the respondents into the clusters.
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The perception of the national priorities determines the clas-
sification of the individuals into the clusters
To investigate how important is the role played by the perception of the national priority in
the degree of support for democracy, we estimate now the augmented model in Equation 12,
where we have added the variable priority to our baseline model. Table 9 shows the estimated
6These countries are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali Uganda and Zambia
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coefficients of this extended model. All the variables that appear in Table 6 are also controlled
for, but some are not shown here. We still find that the effect of remittances is negative in the
first cluster but insignificant in the second one. However, the coefficient of remit in the first
cluster is slightly higher than in the previous Table 6. Regarding the other explanatory variables,
we can stress that the results are very similar to the ones reported in the previous table except
for the coefficients on educ1 that are higher now. The classification of the individuals shown in
Table 11 is slightly different from our previous classification, because now we have not found
any country for which all the respondents are included in the first cluster.
The bottom of Table 9 shows the coefficients on the concomitant variables. Recall that in
the data description section we defined three different national priorities: rights, order, and
economic. We are trying to assess whether an individual’s choice of the main national priority
may affect the probability of being sorted into a cluster. This allows us to test whether an
individual who has chosen a national priority that can only be provided at the public level
is more likely to be sorted into the second cluster where remittances do not hurt support for
democracy. A multinomial logit model is estimated where the reference group is the first cluster.
We first control for order1 and rights1 as determinants of the probability of being in the second
cluster. Our results show that the coefficient on order1 is positive but not significant while
the one on rights1 is positive and statistically significant. This finding indicates that choosing
rights1 as the main national priority increases the probability of being in the non remittance-
curse cluster.
We have further cheked additional checking for the validation of our hypothesis. The estima-
tion results are shown in Table 10. We first replace order1, rights1 and economic1 by order2,
rights2 and economic2. These new national priority variables are coded using the question Q41
of the survey where people are asked to give the second most important national priority. With
these new measures of national priorities, we expect the possibility of finding a negative sign on
the coefficients of rights2 and order2 because we assume that having, for instance, rights as the
next most important national priority means that it is was not awarded the first place. We now
control for right2 and order2, keeping economic2 as the reference variable. The results show
a significant impact of having rights and freedom as national priority but the sign turns now
negative, indicating that people who have chosen rights as the second most important national
priority are less likely to be in the non remittance-curse cluster. This result is quite interesting
because it tells us that when individuals do not think that rights are the first most important
national priority, then they do not see the importance of supporting democracy. The coefficient
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on order2 remains insignificant, even though the sign is negative. In the last specification, we
control simultaneously for the two significant variables, right1 and rights2, and the results show
that only the effect on righst1 remains significant.
In summary, the different specifications present in Table 9 and in Table 10 show that the
perception of individual national priorities is an important determinant for the classification
of respondents into the two detected clusters. Indeed, when focusing on the most important
national priority, we do find that choosing the rights and individual freedoms as the most
important national priorities increases the probability of avoiding the remittance-curse cluster.
However, when focusing on the second most important national priority, we find that people
putting rights and individual freedoms in the second place are more likely to be classified into
the remittance-curse group.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many nations across the Sub-Saharan Africa have received considerable amount of international
inflows, including International Official Aid and the international inflows from Foreign Direct
Investment inflows. The World Bank reports a growing amount of remittances received in many
African countries by households left behind at home from relatives or friends abroad. A number
of studies have investigated the effects of remittances on different socio-economic outcomes,
including poverty, consumption, inequality, and economic growth. Yet, little is known about
the attitudinal and behavioral effects on politics of these inflows in the African context, while
research into their effect on the degree of endorsement and support for democracy has been
quite nonexistent as far as this region is concerned, a region where democracy is a relatively new
concept.
In this paper, we examined the effect of remittances on the legitimacy of democracy in
Africa, testing whether remittance recipients are less likely to support democracy than are the
non-recipients. We argue that the effect of remittances on the support for democracy varies
across groups of individuals sharing similar but unobserved background characteristics. Our
approach consists in determining endogenously whether our data is better generated by multiple
hidden clusters of similar individuals in such a way that the effect of remittances on the degree
of support for democracy depends on the cluster to which belongs the person receiving the
remittances. This provide more flexibility and a better fit of the data.
Using the Afrobarometer surveys we find that our data is better generated by an econometric
model of two different clusters of individuals. In the first cluster remittance recipients are less
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likely than are non-recipients to support democracy, while in the second cluster, remittance
recipients support democracy as much as do the non-recipients. Our analysis of the determinants
of the probability of being in the remittance curse cluster indicates that the perception of the
most important national priorities plays an important role. Indeed, people who have chosen
rights and freedom as the most important national priority have a greater chance of being
sorted into the second cluster than respondents who have chosen national priorities that are
oriented towards the economic conditions in their own country.
This paper has provided new evidence for the effect of remittances on politics in Africa. It
has shown that such non-taxable income may hinder the much needed legitimacy of democracy
in this region if the individuals are more concerned about the improvement of their economic
conditions than their rights and freedom.
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Table 1: Afrobarometer: Descriptive statistics
Variable Question Nb Percentage
Support for democracy q30 Yes 19285 69.60
No* 8422 30.40
Female q101 Male* 13837 49.93
Female 13876 50.07
Education q89 No Formal* 5625 20.33
Some Primary 5111 18.47
Primary 9847 35.59
Secondary 4165 15.05
Post-secondary 2921 10.56
Age q101 <26* 7529 27.50
<36 8059 29.43
>35 11792 43.07
Location URBRUR Urban 10521 37.96
Rural* 17192 62.04
Head of the Household q2 Yes* 14186 51.61
No 13301 48.39
Employment status q94 Inactive 8748 31.68
Unemployed 9507 34.43
Employed* 9358 33.88
Access Media through radio q12a Yes 23997 86.70
No* 3681 13.30
Access Media through TV q12b Yes 15053 54.45
No* 12591 45.55
Access Media through paper q12c Yes 11201 40.61
No* 16384 59.39
Gone without Food q8a Yes 15346 55.50
No* 12305 44.5
Gone without Water q8b Yes 13345 48.23
No* 14324 51.77
Gone without Medecine q8c Yes 16254 58.99
No* 11299 41.01
Been corrupted q51a Yes 5801 21.19
No* 21571 78.81
Have voted q23d Yes 19471 70.64
No* 8093 29.36
* indicates the reference group in the estimations.
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Table 2: Percentage of remittance-recipients by country
Country Remit
Benin 12.28
Botswana 11.43
Burkina Faso 23.09
Cape Verde 49.04
Ghana 22.53
Kenya 10.86
Lesotho 30.05
Liberia 22.29
Madagascar 4.63
Malawi 10.63
Mali 24.27
Mozambique 10.42
Namibia 16.16
Nigeria 24.76
Senegal 31.13
South Africa 15.76
Tanzania 5.35
Uganda 12.88
Zambia 9.55
Zimbabwe 30.42
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Table 3: Perception of national priorities in percent
First most important Second most important
Rights 24.95 50.01
Order 16.49 23.2
Economic 58.57 26.79
Total 100 100
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Table 4: Remittances and Support for Democracy: A Multilevel Analysis
Reference Varibale (1) (3) (5) (7)
No remit -0.116*** -0.135*** -0.164*** -0.156***
(0.0369) (0.0374) (0.0379) (0.0385)
No formal educ1 0.216*** 0.238*** 0.200*** 0.191***
(0.0452) (0.0468) (0.0475) (0.0481)
educ2 0.566*** 0.624*** 0.540*** 0.556***
(0.0415) (0.0448) (0.0465) (0.0472)
educ3 0.708*** 0.778*** 0.652*** 0.674***
(0.0522) (0.0565) (0.0595) (0.0604)
educ4 0.944*** 0.981*** 0.821*** 0.847***
(0.0602) (0.0649) (0.0689) (0.0699)
Male Female -0.348*** -0.323*** -0.294*** -0.297***
(0.0278) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0312)
< 26 age2 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.0289
(0.0383) (0.0387) (0.0405)
age3 0.304*** 0.313*** 0.189***
(0.0402) (0.0406) (0.0428)
rural urban 0.107*** 0.0515 0.0628*
(0.0317) (0.0338) (0.0343)
No head -0.0185 -0.0326 -0.00433
(0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0349)
Employed inactive 0.0553 0.0766** 0.0887**
(0.0384) (0.0389) (0.0394)
Unemployed -0.000312 0.0360 0.0426
(0.0367) (0.0371) (0.0377)
No radio 0.265*** 0.245***
(0.0431) (0.0438)
No tv 0.0498 0.0697*
(0.0386) (0.0391)
No paper 0.0871** 0.0843**
(0.0388) (0.0393)
No food -0.184*** -0.187***
(0.0338) (0.0342)
No water 0.0298 0.0325
(0.0321) (0.0325)
No medecine -0.0733** -0.0617*
(0.0345) (0.0349)
N corruption -0.151***
(0.0371)
No vote 0.365***
(0.0337)
Constant 0.661*** 0.414*** 0.333** 0.165
(0.133) (0.142) (0.146) (0.146)
Observations 27,352 26,736 26,422 26,022
Number of country 20 20 20 20
The table reports coefficients from the multilevel logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for
democracy. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Goodness of fit
Class Gclass BIC CAIC
1 1 30848.98 30869.98
2 1 30951.42 30994.42
3 1 31061.50 31126.50
4 1 31194.89 31281.89
5 1 31304.21 31413.21
6 1 31395.99 31526.99
2 2 29987.09 30032.09
3 2 30091.19 30159.19
4 2 30216.12 30307.12
5 2 30366.78 30480.78
6 2 30465.08 30602.08
2 3 30351.13 30465.13
3 3 29773.03 29844.03
4 3 29945.95 30040.95
5 3 30015.51 30134.51
6 3 30135.61 30278.61
2 4 29669.36 29718.36
3 4 29718.65 29792.65
4 4 29849.11 29948.11
5 4 29953.14 30077.14
6 4 30096.94 30245.94
2 5 29637.59 29688.59
3 5 29710.75 29787.75
4 5 29852.72 29955.72
5 5 29975.35 30104.35
6 5 30110.69 30265.69
6 6 30130.03 30291.03
2 6 29626.83 29679.83
3 6 29705.66 29785.66
4 6 29834.05 29941.05
5 6 2992.19 30126.19
2 7 29644.09 29699.09
3 7 29694.86 29777.86
This table reports the goodness of fit for the different multilevel mixture models estimated,
using different values for the number of clusters. Class refers to the number of clusters at the
individual level while Gclass refers to the number of clusters at the country level. Selected
model in bold.
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Table 6: Remittances and Support for Democracy: A Multilevel Mixture Analysis
Reference Variable Class 1 Class 2
(pi1=0.795) (pi2=0.205)
No remit -0.1811*** -0.1643
(0.0685) (0.1382)
No formal educ1 0.1967*** 0.716***
(0.0719) (0.2417)
educ2 0.3844*** 1.6151***
(0.071) (0.2461)
educ3 0.5664*** 1.6791***
(0.1045) (0.2702)
educ4 0.6022*** 2.0672***
(0.1222) (0.2893)
Male female -0.3341*** -0.3513***
(0.0544) (0.0962)
< 26 age2 0.0507 -0.011
(0.068) (0.1294)
age3 0.1763** 0.308**
(0.0719) (0.1299)
rural urban 0.073 0.0707
(0.0589) (0.1013)
No head -0.0462 0.0769
(0.0583) (0.1043)
Employed inactive 0.1197* 0.0456
(0.0653) (0.1124)
unemployed 0.1073 -0.1078
(0.0656) (0.1145)
No radio 0.241*** 0.4776***
(0.0685) (0.1696)
No tv 0.0979 0.1555
(0.0619) (0.1192)
No paper 0.1083 0.0561
(0.0675) (0.1158)
No food -0.1674*** -0.3197***
(0.0581) (0.1015)
No water 0.163*** -0.2345**
(0.0561) (0.0998)
No medecine -0.0721 -0.0708
(0.0609) (0.1005)
No vote 0.4175*** 0.4258***
(0.0574) (0.1012)
No corruption -0.1169* -0.3727***
(0.0616) (0.1271)
constant 0.7496*** -2.3212***
(0.1331) (0.3271)
Total observations 26022
Overall R-squared 0.3479
This table reports the estimation results of the selected multilevel mixture model from table 5 with
K=2 and L=6. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Standard errors are in
brackets.
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Table 7: Classification of countries
Gclass1 Gclass2 Gclass3 Gclass4 Gclass5 Gclass6
Cape Verde(1) Burkina Faso(1) Benin(1) Mozambique(1) Lesotho(1) Madagascar(1)
Ghana(1) Nigeria(1) Botswana(1) Namibia(1)
Kenya(1) Senegal(1) Uganda(1) South Africa(1)
Liberia(0.99) liberia(0.01) Zambia(1)
Malawi(1) Nigeria(1)
Mali(1) Tanzania(1)
Zimbabwe(1)
This table reports the classification of the countries into the different 6 country clusters found.
In parenthesis are the probability of being in a given cluster Gclass.
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Table 8: Classification of respondents
Country Total Obs percentage in Cluster 1
Benin 1153 100
Botswana 1174 100
Burkina Faso 1063 64.72
Cape Verde 1159 100
Ghana 1128 100
Kenya 1019 100
Lesotho 1146 35.60
Liberia 1166 100
Madagascar 1276 0
Malawi 1089 100
Mali 1201 100
Mozambique 1056 60.79
Namibia 1177 64.40
Nigeria 2121 77.09
Senegal 1067 71.32
South Africa 2211 67.29
Tanzania 1160 75
Uganda 2344 100
Zambia 1153 100
Zimbabwe 1159 74.55
Total 26022 79.55
This table reports by country the percentage of respondents that have a higher probability of
belonging to the remittance curse cluster.
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Table 9: Remittances, Support for Democracy and First National Priority
Reference Variable Class 1 Class 2
(pi1=0.73) (pi2=0.27)
No remit -0.2616** -0.0675
(0.1175) (0.1283)
No formal educ1 0.23** 0.393**
(0.1153) (0.1988)
educ2 0.4091*** 1.1836***
(0.1158) (0.2022)
educ3 0.5915*** 1.2962***
(0.1803) (0.227)
educ4 0.5984*** 1.6478***
(0.2127) (0.2475)
Male female -0.4143*** -0.3758***
(0.1105) (0.0918)
< 26 age2 0.0221 0.0648
(0.1163) (0.1272)
age3 0.1078 0.4074***
(0.1287) (0.1284)
rural urban 0.137 0.0345
(0.1025) (0.0965)
No vote 0.5073*** 0.4091***
(0.1171) (0.097)
No corruption -0.0761 -0.3595***
(0.1041) (0.1195)
Constant 1.1806*** -2.0926***
(0.3093) (0.2874)
Concomitant
Order1 - 0.1148
- (0.0870)
rights1 - 0.4632***
- (0.0868)
Total observations 25800
Overall R-squared 0.49
This table reports the estimation results of the selected multilevel mixture model that includes the
perception of the first most important national priority as concomitants with K=2 and L=6.
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 10: Remittances, Support for Democracy and National Priority
Reference Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster1 Cluster2
(pi1=0.85) (pi2=0.15) (pi1=0.73) (pi2=0.27)
No remit -0.2074*** -0.1421 -0.2432** -0.0859
(0.0559) (0.1499) (0.1201) (0.1282)
Male female -0.3292*** -0.3067*** -0.4141*** -0.3653***
(0.0465) (0.102) (0.1164) (0.0921)
No educ1 0.1982*** 0.537** 0.2085* 0.3883*
(0.0618) (0.2627) (0.1201) (0.1999)
educ2 0.4403*** 1.4054*** 0.3797*** 1.1538***
(0.062) (0.2875) (0.1198) (0.2035)
educ3 0.5735*** 1.481*** 0.551*** 1.2749***
(0.0872) (0.3092) (0.1856) (0.2277)
educ4 0.6643*** 1.862*** 0.5568** 1.6292***
(0.1021) (0.3305) (0.2199) (0.2496)
< 26 age2 0.0494 0.0103 0.0092 0.079
(0.0587) (0.139) (0.1228) (0.1285)
age3 0.1739*** 0.3063** 0.1133 0.391***
(0.0618) (0.1388) (0.1346) (0.1298)
rural urban 0.0952* 0.1107 0.1239 0.0516
(0.0504) (0.1074) (0.1056) (0.0967)
No vote 0.3835*** 0.3986*** 0.519*** 0.3965***
(0.0502) (0.1108) (0.1271) (0.0977)
No corruption -0.1315** -0.3886*** -0.0893 -0.3597***
(0.0526) (0.1427) (0.1071) (0.1199)
constant 0.658*** -2.1424*** 1.2146*** -1.9875***
(0.1163) (0.4077) (0.3319) (0.2909)
Concomitant
rights1 - - 0.466***
- - (0.0915)
order2 - -0.0558
- (0.1416)
rights2 - -0.3140*** - 0.0592
- (0.1155) - (0.0645)
Total observations 25506 25449
Overall R-squared 0.2726 0.4891
BIC 29011.257 28885.7419
CAIC 29066.257 28940.7419
This table reports the estimation results of the selected multilevel mixture model that includes the
perception of the first and second most important national priority as concomitant variables with K=2
and L=6. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 11: Percentage of individuals in cluster 1 by country
Country Total obs percentage in cluster 1
Benin 1152 98.69
Botswana 1174 98.55
Burkina Faso 1046 59.46
Cape Verde 1151 84.54
Ghana 1122 83.33
Kenya 998 83.17
Lesotho 1137 27.35
Liberia 1162 77.28
Madagascar 1254 0
Malawi 1074 80.45
Mali 1196 82.11
Mozambique 1038 61.18
Namibia 1173 64.36
Nigeria 2111 72.43
Senegal 1063 69.71
South Africa 2161 67.79
Tanzania 1153 72.16
Uganda 2338 97.35
Zambia 1142 98.16
Zimbabwe 1155 68.66
This table reports by country the percentage of respondents that have a higher probability of belonging
to the remittance curse cluster using the estimations in table 9.
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